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I. INTRODUCfiON 
On June 26, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its first 
case involving cyberspace, Reno v. ACLU.1 The Court ruled 
that the Communication Decency Act (CDA),2 a federal law 
that bans the communication on the Internet of indecent speech 
aimed at children, violates the First Amendment's guarantee of 
freedom of speech. 
The question of what free speech rights exist in cyberspace 
has been aptly described as a "battle of the analogies." Under 
the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, free 
speech rights vary with the technological medium through which 
the speech is expressed. The Court has been the most solicitous 
of speech from the print media (like newspapers and magazines) 
and the least respectful of broadcast speech (from television or 
radio ).3 The question then becomes: Is expression on the Inter-
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this article's discussion of Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. 
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1. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
2. 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)-(h) (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
3. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) 
(Florida's right to reply statute requiring newspapers to give political candidates a right 
to respond to criticism was struck down under the First Amendment) with Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC fairness doctrine requiring T.V. 
broadcasters to permit politicians an opportunity to respond to criticism from a T.V. sta-
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net more like print, or like T.V. broadcasts, or like some other 
medium, such as telephones? The Supreme Court discussed this 
issue in ACLU. 
This commentary deals mainly with a different but related 
question that is less examined: What effect will cyberspace have 
on how the Supreme Court views the First Amendment? One 
way to start answering that question is to compare ACLU with a 
Supreme Court decision from the 1995-96 term involving inde-
cent speech on cable television, Denver Area Education Tele-
communications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC 
At first glance, the two decisions appear to conflict. In 
Denver, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a plurality opinion advo-
cating a non-categorical "wait and see" approach to free speech 
cases involving new technologies. In ACLU, however, the Court 
ruled decisively that the CDA's restriction on Internet inde-
cency was subject to strict scrutiny which it failed to pass. 
Moreover, none of our current free speech theories seem 
able to reconcile these cases. These include the marketplace, 
self-fulfillment, social outlet, and political theories of free 
speech. My view, however, is that these two cases can be recon-
ciled once it is understood that the Supreme Court is developing 
a new model of free speech analysis in Internet-related cases. 
The Court's new model can best be described as the 
"technology-driven" First Amendment because it is more con-
cerned with preserving the development of new telecommunica-
tion technologies like the Internet than with the niceties of First 
Amendment doctrine. This commentary shows how the Court 
has started to develop this new First Amendment model, and of-
fers several criticisms of how the Court is employing the new 
model. 
II. THE DENVER CASE 
The Denver case examined the constitutionalit¥ of three 
provisions of a federal law regulating cable television. The first 
tion is upheld under the First Amendment). There is also a lengthy discussion of the 
reasons why restrictions on broadcast get more lenient First Amendment scrutiny in 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456-57 (1994). See also 
Norman Redlich, et. al., Understanding Constitutional Law 349 (Matthew Bender, 1995) 
("At the very least, the cases reaffirm that the Court treats the broadcast media and 
print media differently .... "). 
4. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). 
5. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
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provision authorized cable operators to ban indecent program-
ming on their leased access channels (the "ban" provision)." 
The second provision required those cable operators who permit 
such indecent programming to segregate it onto one channel, 
and to block its availability until the cable subscriber requests it 
(the "segregate and block" provision).7 Finally, the law permit-
ted cable operators to prohibit indecent programming on public 
access channels (the "public access" provision). Indecent speech 
was defined in the law as programming depicting "sexual or ex-
cretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as 
measured by contemporary community standards."8 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the "ban" provi-
sion, but struck down the "segregate and block" and the "public 
access" provisions. In upholding the provision that lets cable 
operators ban indecent material, Justice Breyer wrote a plurality 
opinion that was extraordinary in several respects. He explicitly 
refused to select either a definitive level of scrutiny or a cate-
gory in which to place free speech regulations of indecent mate-
rial on cable television.9 He based this refusal on a view that any 
choice of a First Amendment category today for this dynamic 
technology would be based on assumptions that will be rendered 
obsolete by further innovations. 10 He did not want the Court in-
advertently to block these innovations. 
Moreover, despite saying that he was not selecting a level of 
scrutiny or a category, Breyer created a new default standard of 
review called "close judicial scrutiny," which he said underlay 
the Court's various speech cases. 11 Using this approach, he said 
that the cable law could not be sustained unless the government 
could demonstrate that the law "properly addresse[d] an ex-
tremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the 
relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on 
speech." 12 
Breyer upheld the ban provision by reasoning that it re-
stored to private cable operators some limited editorial freedom 
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, § IO(a), !O(b), and IO(c), codified at 47 USC §§53! note, 532 
(1994 ). 
6. Id. at§ IO(a). 
7. ld. at§ lO(b). 
8. Id. at§ 10(a)(2). 
9. Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 
S. Ct. 2374 (1996). 
10. Id. at 2384-85. 
II. ld. 
12. Id. at 2385. 
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and authority over indecent programming-authority they 
would possess in the absence of governmental cable regula-
tions.13 Thus, the ban was a flexible law, not a mandatory gov-
ernmental prohibition. He further found the state had a power-
ful interest in preventing children from seeing this material and 
that the provision was not vague.14 
Breyer then struck down the seRregate and block provision 
as being too rigid and burdensome. The segregate and block 
provision limited cable operators to showing indecent material 
on one channel and required blocking regardless of the circum-
stances of the customer. Under this provision, a customer who 
wrote to his cable company seeking to view the indecent leased 
access channel might also have to wait up to 30 days for no good 
reason before the cable company unblocked that channel. 
Breyer said this waiting period was too restrictive given the 
availability of other technologies, such as the V -chip.16 
Breyer also struck down the third provision, which permit-
ted cable operators to ban indecent programming on public ac-
cess channels. Breyer reasoned that this provision was not justi-
fied since there was insufficient evidence to prove that indecent 
programming was a problem on such channels, especially since 
municipal governments or their agents usuanx regulate the con-
tent of the material on such channels anyway. 7 
Justice David Souter wrote a concurrence indicating that 
the Court should not yet decide on a definitive standard for 
newer technologies in order to "do no harm" to technological 
innovation. 18 To support his position, Souter explained that the 
Court had caused great confusion by stumbling around for 16 
years in the obscenity area before settling on the Miller v. Cali-
fornia standard. 19 Souter said that the Court should not create 
the same problem with these newer technologies by prematurely 
adopting an incorrect standard. Souter said that Breyer was 
therefore right to rely heavily for support on "direct analog[ies]" 
13. ld. at 2387. 
14. I d. at 2387-88. 
15. ld. at 2394. 
16. Jd. at 2392. TheY-chip is a device that can be installed in a TV to enable par-
ents to block out indecent programming. 
17. Jd. at 2397. 
18. Jd. at 2403 (Souter, J., concurring). 
19. Millen-. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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to other specific cases, rather than taking a categorical ap-
proach.20 
Justice Anthony Kennedy (concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) strongly disagreed with Breyer's refusal to adopt a 
clear standard and stated that Breyer was overly "distracted" by 
these dazzling new telecommunications technologies.21 Kennedy 
said that the Court should not abandon its First Amendment ju-
risprudence in such a context but should instead try to apply es-
tablished First Amendment principles to the case.22 
Kennedy then explained that government regulation of ca-
ble television systems had made the leased access channels into 
a "designated public forum." 23 Thus, the content-based restric-
tions of indecent speech on cable, at issue in Denver, should re-
ceive the strictest scrutiny and be struck down. Kennedy's pub-
lic forum analogy could be applied to the Internet as well. 
Justice Stevens authored a concurring opinion that criti-
cized Justice Kennedy's public forum analogy. Stevens reasoned 
that if a medium became an irreversible public forum every time 
the government opened it up to the public, that would actually 
deter the government from opening the medium and reduce free 
speech. Justice Thomas, concurring and dissenting in part, re-
jected the view that cable programmers or viewers had any free 
speech rights at stake in the case. He said that the only parties 
with free speech rights were the cable operators, who owned 
these systems, and that their rights were not violated because 
the law restored their editorial authority. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Although I agree with the result arrived at by Breyer in 
Denver regarding the constitutionality of each provision, I be-
lieve that Justice Breyer's non-categorical approach reflects how 
distracted he is by the Internet, as Justice Kennedy asserted. 
Breyer's flexible approach may seem appealing because it re-
sembles the quickly changing world without boundaries of cy-
berspace, and seems to facilitate that development. It is no ac-
cident that the Harvard Law Review Foreword by Professor 
Cass Sunstein, which discusses the Denver case, is titled Leaving 
20. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2402. 
21. ld. at 2406 (Kennedy, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
22. ld. at 2404. 
23. ld. at 2409. 
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Things Undecided. 24 But Breyer's approach is mistaken for at 
least five reasons. 
First, the new and changing nature of this technology does 
not diminish Breyer's obligation to decide the case or contro-
versy before him on the facts in existence at that time. It seems 
as though Breyer was more worried about how his decision 
would affect the Internet than he was about the ordinary cable 
television case before him. Moreover, the Court cannot wait, in 
these technology cases, until some definite moment in the future 
when these technologies will stop changing and then suddenly 
announce a perfect standard. Technology never stops changing. 
And any standard will be imprecise until it is applied in actual 
cases. 
Second, Breyer's statement that the Court could not select 
a definitive standard to govern cable in the Denver case was 
strange since only two years earlier, in Turner Broadcasting 
Systems, Inc. v. FCC,25 the Court applied an intermediate stan-
dard of review to a structural access regulation of cable televi-
sion. That decision was reaffirmed earlier last term.26 That 
lesser standard would seem appropriate for the ban provision in 
the Denver case because that provision did not totally prohibit 
indecent speech-the government gave private operators the 
authority to make that decision. 
Third, Breyer's deliberately indecisive opinion resembles 
the Supreme Court's much-criticized 1967 obscenity decision in 
Redrup v. New York, 27 when a badly divided Court began ape-
riod of ruling on obscenity cases without agreeing on any stan-
dard. The Court in those cases simply counted hands, after 
viewing the allegedly obscene films, and if five of the justices felt 
that they "knew it when they saw it" then the conviction was 
upheld. The Redrup period was one of the Court's darkest and 
most lawless days. Breyer's refusal to adopt a standard when 
the Court is again divided over sexually explicit speech sounds 
eerily familiar. 
Ironically, Justice Souter's attempt to distinguish his own 
and Breyer's purportedly prudential "do no harm" approach 
24. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996 ). 
25. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). 
26. Turner Broadcasting Systems, lnc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997). The case 
returned to the Court after having been remanded. 
27. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). 
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here from the Supreme Court's 16-year record of flip-flops on 
an obscenity standard ignores the striking similarity between the 
decisions. The obscenity cases also demonstrate that the Court 
can sometimes only arrive at a consensus by initially establishing 
a standard, and then revising that standard over time based on 
how the test works in the lower courts. This valuable testing and 
refining, however, cannot take place if the constitutional stan-
dard is left up in the air. 
Fourth, Breyer's technology-driven approach has many of 
the weaknesses that led the Court only a few years ago to repu-
diate the trimester framework for assessing the constitutionality 
of abortion regulations established in Roe v. Wade. 28 The tri-
mester approach was often criticized as more like a medical 
code contingent on the latest trends in medical technology than 
like constitutional law. Thus, in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 29 the Court upheld a woman's 
right to an abortion but repudiated the trimester system. The 
Court said instead that laws restricting abortion before viability 
are permissible unless they impose an "undue burden. "30 The 
Court also reasoned that the Casey standard, by avoiding a 
technology-driven approach, would end the uncertainty gener-
ated by Roe. 31 In contrast to Casey, the Court's refusal to adopt 
a clear standard in Denver will only create uncertainty for lower 
courts and lawyers. The myriad opinions in this case will exac-
erbate the problem. 
Fifth, Justice Breyer's reliance on direct analogies to other 
cases, rather than on categorical standards, provides little guid-
ance as to why certain speech cases with similar facts are sup-
posedly different. Apparently aware of this problem, Breyer 
adopts a default standard of review. But the meaning of this 
temporary new standard is quite uncertain, unlike the well-
established categorical standards that the Court could have re-
lied upon. Breyer's use of this default standard is also paradoxi-
cal because he maintains that he is not really adopting a stan-
dard. 
Two defenses of Breyer's approach deserve mention. The 
first is from Sunstein's article summarizing the Supreme Court's 
2K Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
29. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 
(1992). 
30. !d. at 874. 
31. !d. at 872. 
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1995-96 term.32 Sunstein essentially argues that the Court best 
preserves its legitimacy in a democratic society by not deciding 
questions beyond those essential to a case. 33 To some extent, 
this could explain Breyer's opinion. But the Denver Court's re-
fusal to decide on a generally applicable standard and its divided 
opinions, provide little guidance to lower courts and lawyers. 
Thus, over time, the Denver decision is likely to diminish the 
Court's legitimacy in the public eye. 
A second defense is that Justice Breyer was simply more 
honest and candid than most Justices because he admitted that 
he was not sure how to decide this question, rather than defini-
tively adopting vague standards. While Breyer may have been 
unusually candid, that does not satisfy his expected job require-
ments. He is expected to establish meaningful legal rules or 
standards that lower courts can follow on a consistent basis.34 
He did not do that. 
IV. THE ACLU CASE 
The ACLU case assessed the constitutionality of two statu-
tory provisions that criminalized indecent speech on the Internet 
aimed at minors. The first provision prohibited the knowing 
transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient 
under age 18 (the "indecent transmission" provision).35 The 
second section outlawed the knowing sending or displaying of 
patently offensive messages in a manner available to a person 
under 18 (the "patently offensive" display provision).36 Patently 
offensive speech was defined almost identically to indecent 
speech in the Denver case. Indecent speech was not defined in 
the so-called transmission section. 
Congress also established two affirmative defenses. One 
protected indecent speakers who took 9ood faith, reasonable, 
effective actions to restrict minor access. 7 The other protected 
those who required proof of age, such as by credit card verifica-
tion. 38 
32. Sunstein, 110 Harv.L.Rev. 4 (cited in note 24). 
33. ld. 
34. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 91·122 (U. of Chi· 
cago Press, 1984); American Bar Association, Judicial Opinion Writing Manual: A 
Product of the Appellate Judges Conference (West, 1991). 
35. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
36. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
37. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A) (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
38. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(B) (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
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Justice Stevens began his majority opinion by essentially 
repeating the findings of fact made by the three-jud&e district 
court as to the dynamic power of the global Internet. He said 
that "[t]he Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of 
worldwide human communication."40 Its content "is as diverse 
as human thought," and "is thus comparable, from the readers' 
viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily 
available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering 
goods and services."4 He further found that cyberspace is 
"located in no particular geographical location but available to 
anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet. "42 
He also described the Internet as the most participatory medium 
in history given the low barriers to access and the parity of 
speaker and listener. 
Justice Stevens' principle reason for finding the CDA un-
constitutional was that it "suppresses a large amount of speech 
that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address 
to one another."43 The CDA's bar on indecent speech aimed at 
minors chills adult free speech because it is technologically im-
possible for adults to ensure that minors are not able to see their 
speech on the boundaryless Internet. 
Justice Stevens also ruled that: (1) the case precedents re-
lied on by the government were inapposite; (2) the Internet is 
not as invasive and dangerous as broadcast media, and functions 
more like telephones; (3) the CDA had vagueness problems; (4) 
the CDA was not well crafted to achieve its asserted goals; (5) 
the affirmative defense provisions were essentially useless be-
cause feasible low-cost technology to keep children from being 
exposed to adult sites does not yet exist; and (6) the CDA could 
not be severed to uphold a subpart. 
Justice Stevens further acknowledged applying the "most 
stringent review of [the CDA] provisions"44 possible because he 
saw the CDA functioning as a content-discriminatory speech 
ban.45 His opinion reads much like an endorsement of the mar-
ketplace theory of unrestricted free speech for adults. He did 
not, however, rule that the CDA was unconstitutionally vague 
39. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E. D. Pa. 1996). 
40. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2334 (1997). 
41. !d. at 2335. 
42. !d. at 2335. 
43. !d. at 2346. 
44. !d. at 2343. 
45. !d. at 2346. 
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or substantially overbroad. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and 
Souter were among those joining his majority. 
Justice O'Connor authored a concurring and dissenting 
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. She agreed 
with the majority that the CDA burdened too much adult 
speech. But she dissented because she viewed the CDA as a 
form of "cyberzoning" akin to a time, place, and manner restric-
tion, not as a content-discriminatory ban.46 She concluded that 
the law was constitutional in part "as applied to a conversation 
involving only an adult and one or more minors-e.g. when an 
adult speaker sends an e-mail knowing the addressee is a mi-
nor. ,47 
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
At first glance, it is hard to reconcile the positions of Jus-
tices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter in support of ACLU's defini-
tive use of strict scrutiny with their support for Denver's phi-
losophy of leaving things undecided. Based on their Denver 
opinions, it seems that they should have voted to strike down 
the CDA for overbreadth or vagueness, rather than select a rigid 
scrutiny level. Three ways to reconcile the Denver and ACLU 
cases, however, come to mind. The most persuasive is that the 
Court is developing a technology-driven free speech model. 
The first explanation is that several members of the Court 
changed their views from Denver to ACLU because they were 
confronted in ACLU with the district court's detailed findings of 
fact about the Internet's operation and its social benefits. In 
fact, the ACLU opinion actually reads as if the Court adopted 
Justice Kennedy's Denver opinion. The ACLU opinion used 
strict scrutiny and treated the Internet like a new public forum. 
This explanation has potential, but nowhere in ACLU do these 
justices suggest that they were mistaken in Denver. 
A second approach is to distinguish the cases factually. The 
Court in Denver assessed the constitutionality of a law that re-
stored editorial discretion (a part of free speech) to a heavily 
regulated cable industry. By contrast, the Court in ACLU dealt 
with an Internet medium that had little history of government 
46. Id. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part an dissenting in part) ("I write 
separately to explain why I view the (CDA) as little more than an attempt by Congress 
to create 'adult zones' on the Internet.") 
47. Id. at 2355. 
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regulation, as well as with a CDA law that was unusually heavy-
handed and content discriminatory. It is therefore natural that 
the Court would reject Internet censorship. Undoubtedly, these 
distinctions help explain the different case results, but they seem 
inadequate to explain the similarities. 
A third possibility, however, is that the Court in both cases 
was driven by the Internet's brilliant capabilities to insulate 
technology from government restraint. Thus, unlike earlier 
Court decisions that limited regulation of the media, like print, 
in order to protect free speech, the Court in the Internet cases 
uses free speech principles to protect the medium. 
In Denver, for example, the Court disregarded traditional 
First Amendment principles by refusing to choose a definite 
scrutiny level so as not to curb the dynamism of new telecom-
munication technologies. In ACLU, the Court chose the most 
speech-protective standard possible in order to foster the same 
goal. Three factors further support this conclusion: (a) the 
Court's emphasis on the facts; (b) the conflict between Justice 
Stevens' majority opinion in ACLU and his prior jurisprudence; 
and (c) the flawed legal arguments in ACLU. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S EMPHASIS ON THE FACTS 
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the district 
court's factual findings to the Supreme Court's decision in 
ACLU. The Supreme Court gave an encyclopedic recitation of 
these findings, embracing the Internet as a positive social force. 
This obsession with the facts was unusual because the Court was 
ruling on a facial challenge to the law, and facial constitutional 
challenges usually are not fact-dependent. 
Interestingly, the district court made its findings after hav-
ing its courtroom wired and after having various experts give it 
extended lessons on "surfing the net." Press accounts suggest 
the district court judges were dazzled by this display and the 
judges' strong sentiments clearly affected the Supreme Court 
too. 48 Indeed, the district court opinion read more like a manual 
on "How to Use the Internet," than like a judicial opinion.49 
48. The New York Times ran an article on the hearings in district court and on how 
the courtroom was "wired." Pamela Mendels, Judges Visit Cyberspace Sites in Suit Over 
an Indecency Law, New York Times sec. 1 at 12 (May 12, 1996). 
49. For example, the district court opinion cited the prices of specific commercial 
software options for blocking indecent Internet messages. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 
824,841 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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The Supreme Court even highlighted, without explanation, an 
extraordinary passage of law from Judge Dalzell's district court 
opinion in which he said that "Congress may not regulate inde-
cency on the Internet at all. "50 
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE 
Justice Stevens' role as author of the ACLU opinion also 
demonstrates that technology was on his mind. Stevens has 
authored several First Amendment opinions suggesting that a 
category of "low-value" speech should be established that would 
permit greater government restriction than for high value politi-
cal speech.51 His low-value category would cover sexually ex-
plicit speech aimed at minors. 
How can one reconcile his ACLU marketplace opinion with 
his other opinions recommending a low-value speech category? 
The answer is that his ACLU opinion is driven by his obvious 
admiration for this new technology. That admiration is the most 
logical explanation for why he uses the strict scrutiny standard in 
ACLU for sexually explicit speech, which he had previously 
treated as low value. The majority's desire to protect the Inter-
net with strict scrutiny also explains why the Court did not 
merely strike down the law as vague or overbroad. 
C. THE PROBLEMS INTHEACLUOPINION 
Although Justice Stevens was quite justified in emphasizing 
the Internet's important social benefits and in his assessment of 
the CDA's many flaws, he makes three problematic legal argu-
ments which also seem technology-driven. 
1. THE VAGUENESS ISSUE 
The Court's reasoning on the vagueness issue was bizarre. 
Though disclaiming any intent to find the CDA vague, the Court 
relied heavily on the supposed ambiguities in the CDA's defini-
50. 117 S. Ct. at 2340 n.30, citing, 929 F. Supp. at 877. 
51. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,70-71 (1976): 
But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the 
citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of 
our choice. Even though the First Amendment protects communication in this 
area from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the 
content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classifica-
tion from other motion pictures. 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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tion of "patently offensive" to conclude that the CDA chills 
great amounts of speech and therefore acts as a content-
discriminatory ban, not as a time, place, and manner restric-
tion.52 
Yet the CDA's definition of "patently offensive" was up-
held by the U.S. Supreme Court in both FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation'3 and Denver. As the district court found in Shea v. 
Reno54, the Denver decision does not permit a vagueness finding 
here. The Court's bootstrapping by finding a law to be content-
discriminatory, because of vagueness issues, without actually 
finding the law to be constitutionally vague is disturbing. 
2. UPHOLDING PART OF THE CDA 
Stevens also mistakenly rejects the dissent's argument that 
the law can constitutionally prohibit an adult from sending an 
indecent Internet message solely to a known, specific minor. 
Stevens said the dissent's view "would confer broad powers of 
censorship in the form of a 'heckler's veto,' upon any opponent 
of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform the 
would-be discoursers that his 17 -year-old child ... would be pre-
sent."55 
Yet Stevens' response makes little sense because it advo-
cates striking down a restriction on indecent speech because of 
the putative actions of an opponent to indecent speech. Moreo-
ver, the dissent's position, that the law is constitutional in part, is 
supported by several decisions where the Court found a com-
pelling interest in banning indecent speech directed at minors, 
such as in the Denver case and in Ginsberg v. New York. 56 
3. COMPARING THE INTERNET TO OTHER MEDIA 
The Court's ruling that speech on the Internet deserves 
more First Amendment protection than broadcast speech is also 
troubling. For example, regarding sexually explicit speech, the 
Court said that Internet users "seldom encounter such content 
52. In discussing the vagueness issue, the Court said that, "Regardless of whether 
the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many ambiguities con-
cerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for purposes of the First 
Amendment." ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2344. 
53. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
54. 930 F. Supp. 916,938 & n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
55. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2349. 
56. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court there upheld a law banning the sale to minors 
under age 17 of material considered obscene as to minors, though not for adults. 
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accidentally" 57 since the Internet requires affirmative steps to 
access material, as compared to simply switching on a television 
or radio broadcast. In addition, the Court said that sexually ex-
plicit Internet sites typically have warnings that prevent a viewer 
from accidental exposure. The Court then indicated that gain-
ing access to sexual material on the Internet was more like using 
a phone-sex line because affirmative steps are needed for both. 
Yet children surfing the net do come across sexually explicit 
speech by accident. Some of the most notorious examples in-
volve sexually crude web locations that hide their content by 
using perfectly innocent-and appealing-site names to draw 
unsuspecting kids. But the real problem with the Internet is not 
accidental discoveries. 
The real problem is that bright and curious children, who 
are often more skilled at computers than their parents, do not 
have the willpower to suppress their curiosity and avoid survey-
ing all sorts of inappropriate material that is seductively dis-
played on the Internet. In addition, many children "surf the 
net" on computers located in their bedrooms where their par-
ents cannot effectively monitor what is being viewed.5R By con-
trast, the television is generally watched in an open family area 
where any effort by children to watch sexual material can more 
easily be stopped. Justice Stevens is also somewhat inconsistent 
in ruling that the warnings on Internet sites are effective at 
keeping children out, but that age and other screening devices 
(the CD A's affirmative defenses) are not effective. 
Moreover, the Court does not meaningfully address the 
specific dangers posed by the Internet that are not present with 
other media. For example, the interactive nature of the Internet 
makes it far more dangerous than either broadcast or phone sex 
lines. There are stories of children being lured to meet people 
they speak with on the Internet only to be injured or killed.59 
Indeed, a television reporter in 1997 pretended to be a child on a 
chat line and numerous pedophiles tried to solicit a meeting.w 
57. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2336. 
58. Anyone who has teenage children knows it is a myth to say that it is easy for 
the parent to restrict what the teenager does with the computer in the bedroom. 
59. Drake Witham, Kids Easy Prey On-Line, FBI Director Says, Detroit Free Press 
18A (Apri!IO, 1997); George Johnson, Old View of Internet: Nerds. New View: Nuts., 
New York Times sec. 4 at I (March 30, 1997) ("Come visit my web site, kiddies, and I'll 
give you some candy.") 
60. The reporter's experiment was carried out on the television show "Good 
Morning America." 
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Sexual "speech" is also cruder on the Internet than on 
broadcast television. And the explicit visual element of Internet 
sexual material makes it far more problematic than phone-sex 
lines. Given the likely dynamic convergence of the various me-
diums over time, the Court might do better to worry about the 
special dangers posed by the Internet's multi-dimensional inter-
active nature rather than obsess about whether affirmative acts 
are needed to log on. 
D. A RESPONSE 
One response to my theory, that the Court has become 
technology-driven in the Internet related cases, is that the Court 
should have used strict scrutiny in Denver because that would be 
more protective of technology than a "wait and see" approach. 
Yet this objection actually supports the technology-driven 
model. 
Use of such a rigid standard there could have potentially 
endangered the constitutionality of a law requiring television 
manufacturers to install the V -chip; a law designed to ensure 
parents can control what their kids watch. Under strict scrutiny, 
such a law could be struck down as not being narrowly tailored 
to ensuring that children are not exposed to this material.61 
Denver's more flexible approach, however, would seem to facili-
tate government's role in encouraging technology innovations 
that permit private actors, like parents and cable operators, to 
decide whether to permit this speech. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the 21st Century, the U.S. Supreme Court will face diffi-
cult First Amendment questions regarding cyberspace, such as 
the meaning of contemporary local community standards in ob-
scenity cases and the applicability of the current tests for subver-
sive advocacy. The Denver and ACLU cases suggest that the 
Court may permit the First Amendment to be a hand-maiden to 
this new technology. The flaws in the Court's reasoning in those 
cases, however, show that a technology-driven approach would 
be a mistake. The Court should instead remain faithful to sound 
First Amendment standards. Given the Internet's dynamism, 
61. Benjamin M. Dean, The Age-Based Ratings System: An Unfortunate Response 
to the V-Chip Legislation, 4 Va. J. of Soc. Pol. & L. 743, 791 (1997) (discussing the con-
stitutional issues posed by the V-chip law). 
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the unprincipled modification of such standards would create 
chaos. 
